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ABSTRACT 
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?* 
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a 
large-scale internet experiment we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off 
period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a 
standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects received 
lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. 
In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-
off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, 
rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment 
difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities. 
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the stability of emotional inuences on economic decision-
making. While standard economic theory has emphasized the rationality of eco-
nomic agents, dual-system models of decision-making argue that human behavior
can be viewed as the outcome of the interaction between a (fast) a¤ective system
that reacts to emotions and motivational drives and a (slower) goal-based cognitive
system.1 Evidence indicates that the a¤ective system tends to react rst and to
initially hold sway over the cognitive system (see e.g. Zajonc, 1984).
Indeed, in the context of negotiations, recent neuroeconomic evidence (see e.g.,
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Sanfey et al., 2003) shows that negative emotions, like
anger, play an important role in subjectsdecisions to reject o¤ers that are deemed
unfair (even though subjects forgo money by doing so). At the same time, it has
long been argued by practitioners (see e.g., Adler, Rosen, and Silverstein, 1998)
that cooling-o¤ periods (where negotiations are temporarily halted) are successful
in lessening anger and help to avoid break-down of negotiations.2 This raises the
question whether after some time the deliberative system indeed prevails and leads
parties participating in negotiations to accept o¤ers that, while being perceived as
unfair, have some monetary value nevertheless? Put di¤erently, does anger really
subside with one nights sleep?
Investigating this issue may shed light on three questions. First, it might help
to understand why bargaining frequently breaks down. Do negotiations break down
1Such dual perspectives on decision-making are ubiquitous in psychology (see e.g., Kahneman,
2003; Chaiken and Trope, 1999). More recently, dual-system models have also been employed by
economic theorists having rediscovered Adam Smiths (1790) long-ago insight that human behavior
frequently emerges as the outcome of a struggle between passionsand an impartial spectator
(see e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Bernheim and
Rangel, 2004; Loewenstein and ODonoghue, 2004; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988).
2Cooling-o¤ periods are also common instruments in consumer law, labor law, and a variety of
other contexts (see e.g., Camerer, Issacharo¤, Loewenstein, ODonoghue, and Rabin, 2003; Rekaiti
and Van den Bergh, 2000; Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy, 1999).
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due to subjects stable preferences for equitable outcomes as suggested by recent
fairness theories,3 or due to hot emotional states that are, however, transient and lose
importance over time? Second, more generally, how robust are results of (economic)
experiments where emotions might play a role? Third, if cooling-o¤ plays a role,
under which circumstances is it more likely to be relevant? For example, does the
e¤ect of cooling-o¤ (or, more generally, the e¤ect of emotions) depend on what is at
stake? Is it reasonable to assume that people tend to reect stronger on high-stakes
decisions?
To examine these questions we study behavior in a particularly onesided and
unfair bargaining environment, the well-known ultimatum game (Güth, Schmit-
tberger, and Schwarze, 1982; Nowak, Page, and Sigmund, 2000; and many others).
Abundant experimental evidence documents that in the ultimatum game unfair of-
fers from proposers are frequently rejected by responders, even though responders
forgo money by doing so.4 This suggests that rejection rates in the ultimatum game
might fall if a cooling-o¤ period is imposed.
Our innovation is that responders in the experiment get the (unanticipated)
chance for revising their original decision after a 24-hour cooling-o¤ period. We
shall consider three alternative hypotheses that di¤er in whether and how rejection
behavior by the responder changes from the rst (initial) decision to the second
(nal) decision, which takes place after the cooling-o¤ period. First, the uncon-
ditional cooling-o¤hypothesis would predict that rejection rates are lower for the
nal decision than for the initial decision regardless of what is at stake. Second, the
coolingo¤ if stakes are highhypothesis would predict that, after the cooling-o¤
period, the tradeo¤ between emotions and rationality is decided in favor of ratio-
nality if stakes are perceived by subjects as high and decided in favor of emotions
3See e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
4For surveys, see e.g., Camerer (2003) and Roth (1995).
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if they are perceived as low. Finally, the rationalhypothesis would predict that
rejection rates are low for both, the initial decision and the nal decision because
receiving any positive amount is better than receiving nothing for a rational decision
maker who maximizes his expected monetary payo¤.
We explore these hypotheses in an experiment conducted on the internet with
1250 participants. Subjects play an ultimatum minigame, in which proposers
can make only two di¤erent o¤ers about how to divide 10 Lotto-Euros, an 8:2
split or a 5:5 split.5 Responders can then accept or reject the respective o¤er. If
they reject, both subjects get nothing. If they accept, the amount is divided as
suggested by the proposer, namely 8 Lotto-Euros for the proposer and 2 for the
responder or 5 for both, respectively. All responders receive an email 24 hours after
their initial decision that gives them the opportunity to reconsider their decision.
Responders learn of this possibility only after having made their initial decision.
We make it clear that (i) every responder independently of his initial decision would
be given this opportunity and (ii) the proposer would only be informed about the
responders nal decision.
We implement two di¤erent ways of paying subjects. In the cash treatment sub-
jects receive their payo¤s (2, 5, or 8 Lotto-Euros, respectively, exchanged one-to-one
into actual euros) in the mail as cash. In the lottery treatment subjects receive the
respective number of lottery tickets, which each has an equal chance of winning one
out of six large prizes of 500 euros each. In both, the cash treatment and the lottery
treatment, the expected monetary value of one Lotto-Euro is the same and equal to
one euro, and this is known to subjects. However, as Tversky and Kahneman (1992,
p. 298) have pointed out, ...people often prefer a small probability of winning a
large prize over the expected value of that prospect, i.e., they exhibit non-linear
5For a more detailed discussion of internet experiments and related methodological issues, see
e.g., Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005, 2007).
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probability weighting.6 Therefore, we use the lottery treatment to emulate a high
stakes environment (where subjects might be more reluctant to reject the (un-
fair) 8:2 o¤er). Without a lottery a high stakes condition would obviously be very
expensive to carry out.7
We nd clear evidence in favor of the coolingo¤ if stakes are highhypothesis.
First, lower rejection rates in the lottery treatment than in the cash treatment both
at the initial decision and the nal decision indicate that subjects were indeed more
tempted by the small prospect to win a large prize.8 Second, after the cooling-o¤
period, there is a statistically signicant drop in the rejection rate of unfair o¤ers by
25 percent in the lottery treatment. Rejection rates in the cash treatment, however,
are high initially (as has previously been found in many other experiments) and
remain so after 24 hours. Taken together, relative to the initial rejection rate in the
(standard) cash treatment, by paying subjects through a lottery and by additionally
allowing for cooling-o¤, the rejection rate drops by more than 50% (in which case,
from an ex-post perspective, making the unfair o¤er would have been optimal for a
selsh, risk-neutral proposer).
Cognitive abilities may play an important role for negotiation tactics. To po-
tentially identify di¤erent behavioral types, in the post-experimental questionnaire
we also conduct the Cognitive Reection Test (CRT), which has recently been
put forward by Frederick (2005). This simple three-item test intends to di¤erentiate
between more impulsive and more reective decision makers.9 This test is inter-
6On non-linear probability weighting, see also e.g., Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Prelec (1998).
For a recent application in the context of nancial markets, see e.g., Barberis and Huang (2008).
7Note that in the lottery treatment the (relatively large) size of the prizes was constant but,
depending on the o¤er (and its acceptance), the probability of winning di¤ered, which is in contrast
to earlier experiments on the ultimatum game that randomly selected pairs of players who were
actually paid (see e.g., Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter, 2003).
8The earlier experimental literature provides mixed evidence on the e¤ect of high stakes on
rejection rates in the ultimatum game (see e.g., Roth et al., 1991; Slonim and Roth, 1998).
9That is, the CRT-test does not aim to measure intelligence per se, but rather the ability or
disposition to resist the response that rst comes to mind(Frederick, 2005, p. 35).
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esting because Frederick (2005) documents that the CRT-score correlates strongly
with subjectstime and risk preferences,10 and the CRT compares very favorably in
terms of predicting behavior to substantially more complex personality tests. We
show that there is a relationship between the CRT-score and behavior also in our
experiment. In particular, the di¤erence in initial rejection rates between the cash
treatment and the lottery treatment is almost exclusively driven by subjects scor-
ing low in the CRT-test, i.e., only impulsivedecision-makers seem to be prone to
non-linear probability weighting.11
2 Experimental design
In this section, we rst discuss how we recruited subjects, how the experiment
was implemented, and why conducting the ultimatum mini-game on the internet is
especially suited to address our research questions. We then introduce the Cognitive
Reection Test, and nally describe how we paid subjects.
2.1 Recruiting, Implementation, and Design Choices
In total 1250 participants participated in our online, web-based experiment. Sub-
jects were recruited via emails. Email addresses were obtained from the economic
experimental laboratories in Bonn, Cologne, and Mannheim (excluding students
who had already participated in bargaining experiments). All those contacted had
indicated their interest in participating in economic experiments. Of the partici-
pants, 90% were university students, 25% studied economics or business, and 46%
were female. Average age of participants was 24 years.
The timing of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 1. After logging in on
10For example, subjects with a relatively high CRT-score (reectivedecision-makers) are sig-
nicantly more patient.
11Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2008) replicate Fredericks (2005) results on time and risk
preferences, and nd that the CRT-score also correlates strongly with a number of behavioral
biases, such as base rate neglect, conservatism, or overcondence.
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our website and providing some personal background information, subjects played
a one-shot mini-ultimatum game between a proposer and a responder, where the
proposer could make one out of two possible o¤ers to divide a cake of 10 Lotto-
Euros(our experimental currency). The website was linked to the Laboratory for
Experimental Research in Economics at the University of Bonn to demonstrate that
the experiment had a proper scientic background and that the promised nancial
rewards were credible. Each subject played one of our treatments once (see the
appendix in Section 5 for a translation of the instructions).
Figure 1: Timing of the experiment.
The proposer could either make the o¤er 5:5 (leaving both with the same
number of Lotto-Euros) or the o¤er 8:2 (leaving the proposer (responder) with
8 (2) Lotto-Euros). After having read a description of the ultimatum game, each
responder was told which o¤er the (randomly assigned, anonymous) proposer had
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made. Afterwards, the responder was asked to either reject or accept this o¤er
(initial decision). Immediately after having made his choice, each responder was
told that independent of his decision, every responder would have the opportunity
to change his decision. That is, responders learnt of this possibility only after
having made the initial decision. 24 hours (the cooling-o¤ period) after his initial
decision every responder received an automatic email containing a link redirecting
him to the decision page. Only after this second (and nal) decision, the proposer
was notied whether his o¤er had been accepted, and responders knew that the
respective proposer would only learn their nal decision. Proposers were unaware
of the existence of a cooling-o¤ period as they were told only that they would be
notied about the respective responders decision within the next couple of days.
Emotional cooling-o¤ might certainly play a role in a variety of contexts. We
chose the ultimatum game for several reasons. First, it is very easy to explain to
subjects. Thus, there is little danger that the di¤erence between the initial and the
nal decisions is due to the fact that subjects understood the rules only after the
cooling-o¤ period. Second, there is a large literature to compare our results to. The
ultimatum mini-game instead of the unrestricted ultimatum game was chosen to
facilitate collecting more data on the rejection rates for particular o¤ers.
Conducting the experiment on the internet allowed us to generate a high number
of observations at reasonable cost. Also, a cooling-o¤ period is easier to implement
on the internet than in the lab. While conducting the experiment over the internet
implies a certain loss of control relative to the laboratory, we had several measures
in place to alleviate this issue. First, to prevent subjects from playing multiple
times, each name-postal code combination (winners were notied via ordinary mail)
and each email address was only allowed to play once. Second, immediately after
having entered their personal data subjects received an email containing a link that
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allowed them to continue the experiment (see Figure 1). Thereby, we made sure
that for each subject we had a valid email address, which was necessary to alert
responders of the end of the cooling-o¤ period.12 Finally, to reduce the possibility of
di¤erent responders making each other aware of the cooling-o¤ period prematurely,
participants logging in on our website having an IP-address similar to the IP-address
of an earlier participant (who had played within the last 30 minutes) were assigned
to be a proposer.
2.2 Cognitive Reection Test
The Cognitive Reection Test (CRT) introduced by Frederick (2005) is a quick
and simple three-item personality test, and we administered this test in the post-
experimental questionaire (see Figure 1). The CRT aims to di¤erentiate between
more impulsive and more reective decision-makers. To achieve this, each of the
three questions of the CRT has a seemingly intuitive (but incorrect) answer that
springs quickly to mind, and the overwhelming majority of subjects indeed provide
either the impulsive or the correct response (see Table 1).
The questions of the CRT are not di¢ cult in the sense that the correct solution
is easily understood when explained to subjects. Moreover, if a solution springs to
mind it is easy for subjects to verify whether their response is indeed correct. That is,
the CRT does not measure cognitive abilities per se. However, in the CRT, arriving
at the correct answer may require overcoming the initial, impulsive response.
Overall, 1172 subjects completed the CRT, and 39.16% answered all three ques-
tions correctly. 30.20% of subjects answered two questions, 18.34% answered one
question, and 12.29% answered none of the questions correctly.
12Note that of the responders who initially accepted (respectively rejected) the unequal o¤er
equally high fractions actually took the opportunity to return to the nal decision screen after the
cooling-o¤ period (93.3%, respectively 93.0%). If a responder did not actually take a nal decision,
we assumed that he meant to stay at his initial decision.
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Table 1: Cognitive Reection Test
Question Correct Impulsive
response response
A bat and a ball cost 110 cents in total. 5 10
The bat costs 100 cents more than the (52.56%) (43.34%)
ball. How much does the ball cost?
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 100
5 widgets, how long would it take 100 (68.35%) (23.29%)
machines to make 100 widgets?
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. 47 24
Every day, the patch doubles in size. (75.34%) (15.02%)
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover
the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake?
Note: The total number of observations is 1172. In parentheses, we report
the relative frequency of the respective response.
2.3 Treatments and Payment
For the ultimatum mini-game, subjects were paid as follows. In the lottery treat-
ment, we conducted at the end of the experiment a lottery with six prizes of 500
euros each. Lotto-Euros of subjects were converted 1:1 into lottery tickets. Each
lottery ticket had an equal chance of winning. Importantly, the expected value of
a lottery ticket was xed in advance and equal to one (actual) euro, and this was
known to subjects. Winners were notied by mail, and their prize money was trans-
ferred electronically to their bank account. In the cash treatment, each Lotto-Euro
was converted 1:1 into euros. Payo¤s (in cash) were sent to subjects by mail.
After the ultimatum game decisions were taken, subjects were asked to ll in
the post-experimental questionnaire. In the cash treatment, they were told that
6 of the participating subjects would be drawn at random and paid according to
the following rules: Each drawn subject would receive a lump sum payment of 60
euros for lling in questions about their emotions. Furthermore, they would receive
9
5 euros for each correct answer on the CRT questions. There were also some more
questions, which were used for a di¤erent experiment. In the lottery treatment, the
questionnaire was unpaid. The results with respect to the CRT scores, however,
do not di¤er between treatments. In both treatments, the average CRT score (i.e.
the average number of correct questions) was 2.05 (which places our subjects well
between students of MIT and Princeton in Fredericks sample).
3 Results
In a preliminary step, we hypothesized that, due to non-linear probability weighting,
responders might be more reluctant to reject 8:2 o¤ers in the lottery treatment than
in the cash treatment.13 To investigate this issue we compare the rejection rates
for the initial decision (right after responders received the 8:2 o¤er) across our two
treatments. In the (standard) cash treatment, which has frequently been employed
in the previous literature, the initial rejection rate is 42.55%, which is in line with
earlier ndings (see e.g., Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003) and in contradiction
to the rational hypothesis (see Table 2 for an overview on the main results of the
experiment). In the lottery treatment, however, in which high prizes were available,
initial rejection rates are signicantly lower at 27.68% (Fisher exact test, one-tailed,
P=0.018); indicating that subjects indeed found the (small) prospect to win a large
prize more acceptable than the (small) expected value of this gamble. Hence, the
lottery treatment indeed seems to emulate a high stakesenvironment.14
In a next step, we study the e¤ects of the cooling-o¤period. In the (low stakes)
13 In both treatments, the 5:5 o¤er was rejected by less than 2.5% of responders.
14 In the lottery treatment, a somewhat larger fraction of proposers made the 8:2 o¤er (see Table
2). However, this di¤erence is not statistically signicant, which might be due to the fact that we
conducted a one-shot experiment: Slonim and Roth (1998), in their experiment on the e¤ects of high
stakes in the ultimatum-game, report that proposers adjusted their behavior to the introduction of
high stakes only slowly over the course of multiple rounds. Stahl and Haruvy (2008) have conducted
treatments similar to our cash and lottery treatments. However, in their experiment the available
prize was only $5 and they do not nd signicantly di¤erent behavior across treatments.
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Table 2: O¤ers and rejections
treatment
lottery cash
o¤ered 5:5 213 (65.5 %) 206 (68.7 %)
split 8:2 112 (34.5 %) 94 (31.3 %)
rejections initial decision 5 (2.35 %) 5 (2.43 %)
of 5:5 o¤er nal decision 2 (0.94 %) 3 (1.46 %)
rejections initial decision 31 (27.68 %) 40 (42.55 %)
of 8:2 o¤er nal decision 23 (20.54 %) 37 (39.36 %)
Note: Shown are the absolute numbers of o¤ers and rejections in the lottery treat-
ment (left column) and the cash treatment (right column) both for the initial decision
(right after responders received the o¤er) and for the nal decision (after a 24 hour
cooling-o¤ period). The percentages of o¤ers and rejection frequencies are reported
in parentheses.
cash treatment rejection rates do not noticeably drop from the initial to the nal
decision. In the (high stakes) lottery treatment, however, rejection rates rejection
rates were signicantly reduced by more than 1/4 to 20.54% after the cooling-o¤
period. Table 3 shows a crosstabulation of responders decisions after receiving
the unfair 8:2 o¤er. For example, in the lottery treatment, 11 responders rejected
the 8:2 split initially but accepted it after the 24-hour cooling-o¤ period. The
hypothesis that subjects are equally likely to accept unfair o¤ers in both decision
periods is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that cooling-o¤ lowers rejection rates
at the 5%-level of a onesided non-parametric McNemar change test (P=0.029).15
To summarize, relative to the initial rejection rate in the (standard) cash treatment,
by paying subjects through a lottery and by additionally allowing for cooling-o¤,
the rejection rate drops by more than 1/2 from 42.55% to 20.54%.
To learn more about why subjects decided the way they did, we asked sub-
jects about their motivations in a free-format question of the post-experimental
questionnaire. Interesting for our purposes are, in particular, the answers of those
15On the McNemar change test, see e.g., Siegel and Castellan (1988).
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Table 3: Number of respondersdecisions following an 8:2 o¤er
treatment
lottery cash
nal decision
initial decision accept reject
accept 78 3
reject 11 20
nal decision
initial decision accept reject
accept 48 6
reject 9 31
Note: Crosstabulation of absolute numbers of respondersdecisions after receiving
the 8:2 o¤er.
responders who changed their mind during the cooling-o¤ period. In the lottery
treatment, where cooling-o¤ had a signicant e¤ect, 9 out of the 11 responders who
changed their mind from rejection to acceptance of the o¤er stated something like
two lottery tickets are better than none.At the same time, the 8:2 o¤er seems to
have aroused similar (negative) emotions in both the cash treatment and the lottery
treatment. In the post-experimental questionnaire we asked subject to recall what
they felt at the moment they made their nal decision. On a 7-point scale, sub-
jects had to rate their emotions for anger, envy, surpriseand gratefulness.
As expected, responders who received the unfair o¤er felt signicantly more anger,
more envy, and less gratefulness than responders who received the 5:5 o¤er (pair-
wise Mann-Whitney U tests, one-tailed, P<0.001).16 However, the reported emotion
levels do not di¤er signicantly across the cash and lottery treatments. Hence, in
the lottery treatment, subjects apparently had a stronger incentive to contemplate
accepting the proposal during the cooling-o¤ period. This is exemplied by some
of the answers to the above free-format question stating that The initial rejection
resulted from my desire to pay player A back. In the end, reason implied my change
of mind.Or, This time [i.e., at the nal decision] I thought less about player A
and he ripping me o¤, instead I thought of nothing but myself.
16They also felt signicantly less surprise, which indicates that the majority of responders ex-
pected the unfair o¤er.
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As discussed above, in order to possibly identify distinct behavioral types that
may drive the di¤erence in behavior in our two treatments, we administered Freder-
icks (2005) Cognitive Reection Test (CRT). Splitting the sample of subjects into
those that get 2 or 3 questions right in the CRT (reective decision-makers) and
those that get less than 2 questions right (impulsive decision-makers), we can ob-
serve an interesting phenomenon that may explain part of the di¤erence between the
standard cash treatment and the lottery treatment. Figure 2 depicts mean rejection
rates for the initial decision split according to CRT performance.
Figure 2: Average rejection rates of responders when receiving the 8:2 o¤er in the
lottery treatment (black bars) and the cash treatment (white bars) for subjects with
a CRT score of 0 or 1 and subjects with a CRT score of 2 or 3, respectively.
While reective decision-makers show no di¤erence in mean rejection rates be-
tween treatments, impulsive decision-makers have more than twice the rejection rate
in the cash treatment than in the lottery treatment (Fisher exact test, one-tailed,
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P=0.023). It seems that impulsive decision-makers are particularly susceptible to
non-linear probability weighting, which leads them to treat payo¤s in the lottery
treatment as high stakes, while reective responders seem to base their initial deci-
sion on the expected value of the gamble.17
Reective and impulsive responders also di¤er in an instructive way in the time
it takes them to form their initial decisions. While in both the lottery treatment and
the cash treatment, it takes reective decision-makers almost exactly the same time
to either accept or reject an (unfair) 8:2 o¤er (see Panel B of Figure 3), the picture
looks markedly di¤erent for impulsive decision makers (see Panel A of Figure 3).
Figure 3: Decision times of responders who received the 8:2 o¤er when their initial
decision is to reject it (black bars) or to accept it (white bars) for (A) responders
with CRT scores of 0 or 1, and (B) for responders with CRT scores of 2 or 3. In
both gures the two bars on the left refer to the lottery treatment and the two on the
right to the cash treatment. Decision timeis measured as the di¤erence between
the time the initial decision screen was displayed to the respective responder and
the time the initial decision was submitted.
17Similar to Frederick (2005), we nd that the CRT score di¤ers signicantly across men and
women. However, the CRT score does not proxy for gender as the above CRT e¤ect emerge
separately both for men and women.
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In the lottery treatment, the median time it takes impulsive decision-makers
to reject an 8:2 o¤er is 114 seconds, whereas in the cash treatment, it is only 56
seconds, which is signicantly shorter (Mann-Whitney U test, one-tailed, P=0.036).
In contrast, accepting the (unfair) o¤er requires shorter median decision times in
the lottery treatment. This seems to indicate that, for impulsive responders, in
the lottery (cash) treatment the impulsive way to react is to accept (reject) the
unequal o¤er, and it seems to take time to overcome this initial impulse.18
Finally, we briey discuss the robustness of our results. First, in order to rule
out a possible alternative explanation for lower rejection rates at the nal decision,
in the post-experimental questionnaire we asked responders whether they had talked
about the experiment with third parties during the cooling-o¤ period. This might
be an issue because there is evidence that groups are more willing to accept unequal
o¤ers in the ultimatum game (see e.g., Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998). However, only
one of the responders who had changed his mind reported to have talked to someone
(and at the same time stated that this had not inuenced his decision). Second, we
implemented a within-subject design to control for unobserved heterogeneity and
obtain more power in statistical tests. A drawback may be that subjects could be
reluctant to change their initial decisions due to cognitive dissonance. However, this
would imply that our above results provide only a lower bound on the potential e¤ect
of cooling-o¤, and actual e¤ects may be larger. Third, despite the fact that subjects
were recruited via o¢ cial mailing-lists of established experimental laboratories, one
might wonder whether subjects found our promise of later payment credible. This
might be an issue because there is evidence indicating that rejection rates are higher
for hypothetical payo¤s than for real payo¤s (see e.g., Cameron, 1999). However,
payment via a lottery is arguably less credible than payment in cash, which, contrary
18For other studies on decision times in the context of the ultimatum game, see e.g., Knoch,
Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, and Fehr (2006) and Rubinstein (2007).
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to what we nd, would predict higher rejection rates in the lottery treatment. Hence,
in a similar vein to above, if credibility was an issue at all, it would lead us to
underestimate the e¤ect of the lottery treatment on the initial rejection rate.
4 Conclusion
To summarize, in our internet experiment on the ultimatum game we nd that re-
jection rates drop signicantly when subjects have the opportunity to (emotionally)
cool-o¤ and stakes are perceived as high. If stakes are perceived as low, rejection
rates are high before and after the cooling-o¤ period. This suggests that cooling-o¤
indeed seems to work in controversial bargaining situations when stakes are su¢ -
ciently high. More generally, our results indicate that a part of the rejections of
unfair o¤ers observed in earlier experiments (without cooling-o¤ periods) might be
driven not by stable preferences for fairness, reciprocity or other forms of social
preferences but by relatively low stakes and by an emotional drive to punish the
proposer, which, however, seems to fade away over time. To put it with Horace,
anger is a short madness.
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5 Appendix: Instructions
In the following we present an English translation of the German instructions. Each
centered subheading represents a distinct page of our website respectively an email
we sent to participants (see Figure 1 above). With respect to the post-experimental
questionnaire we focus on questions posed to responders. The below translation of
the instructions relates to the lottery treatment. Di¤erent formulations in the cash
treatment are indicated in parentheses.
Introduction
Experiments on the internet
With the help of experiments on the internet the Universities of Bonn, Heidelberg,
and Cologne want to verify various scientic theories. Further information about
experimental economic research can be found here [hyperlink].
By participating in this experiment you support our scientic work. At the same
time, you have the chance to earn some money within the experiment.
This experiment is about the division of 10 Lotto-Eurosbetween two anonymous
participants. The other participant with whom you play is randomly chosen.
We would be very pleased if you answered a few questions at the end of the exper-
iment. Hence, in case you decide to participate, please play until the end of the
experiment. The answers will take a few minutes only.
Upon conclusion of the experiment, your earned Lotto-Euros are exchanged for
lottery tickets. Every Lotto-Euro is worth one ticket. In total, there will be 3000
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tickets and 6 participants will win 500 euros each. Every ticket has the same chance
of winning. Thus, the more Lotto-Euros you have, the better is your chance of
winning. Winners will be notied by regular mail.
(In the cash treatment, the above paragraph was replaced by the following text: Upon
completion of the experiment, we will send each of the 600 participants the earned
Lotto-Euros exchanged one-to-one into actual euros - in cash by regular mail.)
Personal data
Your data
Welcome to our online experiment!
Please note that each player can participate in the experiment only once.
Before you start with the game, we would like to ask you for some personal data.
The outcomes of the game will be analyzed in an anonymous way, clearly separated
from your personal data. The address will be used only to notify the winners. The
data regarding eld of study, age, and gender will serve only the scientic analysis.
Important: Please make sure that that you enter a valid e-mail address, because
you will receive e-mail from us within the experiment. Of course, we will treat also
your e-mail address condentially.
You can nd further information regarding data security in the data protection
declaration [hyperlink].
Surname: [ ____________ ]
First name: [ ____________ ]
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Street: [ ____________ ]
Street number: [ ____________ ]
Zip code: [ ____________ ]
City: [ ____________ ]
E-mail: [ ____________ ]
Conrm e-mail: [ ____________ ]
Do you attend university? [ pull-down menu ]
Field of study: [ pull-down menu ]
If you attend university: for how many terms have you been studying? [ pull-down
menu ]
If you have graduated already: are you a PhD student? [ pull-down menu ]
Age: [ pull-down menu ]
Gender: [ pull-down menu ]
E-mail notice
How to carry on
Thank you for entering you data.
Now you will receive an e-mail in which there will be a link to continue the experi-
ment.
The e-mail should arrive in your in-box right now.
Thank you very much for supporting our project!
Immediate e-mail
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Dear participant:
Once again, thank you very much for your participation!
Please click on the following link to continue with the experiment: [hyperlink]
Proposer: decision screen
The experiment
This experiment is about the one-time division of 10 Lotto-Euros between you and
another randomly chosen participant. Anonymity is guaranteed; this means that
none of the participants will nd out with whom he or she has played. Also, the
decisions you make will be treated condentially.
How many Lotto-Euros you and the other participant will earn depends on the
decisions that both of you will make.
The two participants that have been assigned to each other are each allocated to
one of two possible roles, respectively: the role of player A or the role of player B.
Which participant is allocated to which role is again randomly chosen.
Player A proposes how the 10 Lotto-Euros should be split. Player A has two possi-
bilities. He or she can make the o¤er 5:5or the o¤er 8:2.
The o¤er that player A has made will be transmitted to player B. Player B can
either accept or reject the o¤er.
Assume that player A has made the o¤er 5:5.If player B accepts, both participants
will receive 5 Lotto-Euros.
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Assume that player A has made the o¤er 8:2. If player B accepts, player A will
receive 8 Lotto-Euros and player B will receive 2 Lotto-Euros.
If player B rejects the o¤er, then both participants receive 0 Lotto-Euros.
These rules are known to both participants.
Your decision
Your role is the one of player A.
Which o¤er do you make? [ 5:5 / 8:2 ]
Responder: initial decision screen
The experiment
This experiment is about the one-time division of 10 Lotto-Euros between you and
another randomly chosen participant. Anonymity is guaranteed; this means that
none of the participants will nd out with whom he or she has played. Also, the
decisions you make will be treated condentially.
How many Lotto-Euros you and the other participant will earn depends on the
decisions that both of you will make.
The two participants that have been assigned to each other are each allocated to
one of two possible roles, respectively: the role of player A or the role of player B.
Which participant is allocated to which role is again randomly chosen.
Player A proposes how the 10 Lotto-Euros should be split. Player A has two possi-
bilities. He or she can make the o¤er 5:5or the o¤er 8:2.
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The o¤er that player A has made will be transmitted to player B. Player B can
either accept or reject the o¤er.
Assume that player A has made the o¤er 5:5.If player B accepts, both participants
will receive 5 Lotto-Euros.
Assume that player A has made the o¤er 8:2. If player B accepts, player A will
receive 8 Lotto-Euros and player B will receive 2 Lotto-Euros.
If player B rejects the o¤er, then both participants receive 0 Lotto-Euros.
These rules are known to both participants.
Your decision
Your role is the one of player B.
Player A has made the o¤er 5:5.
Do you accept the o¤er? [yes / no]
Responder: notice
Your decision
Thank you for your entry.
How to carry on
Independent of the respective decision, each player B gets the opportunity to change
his or her decision.
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For this purpose, you will automatically receive an e-mail after 24 hours. The e-mail
will contain a link with which you will be able to return to the decision page and to
the post-experimental questionnaire.
Only after that, the experiment will end and only then, we will let player A know
whether you have accepted or rejected his or her o¤er.
Thank you very much for participating!
Responder: e-mail after 24 hours
Dear participant:
Once again, thank you very much for your participation!
Please make now your nal decision with regard to player As o¤er. Please click on
the following link to do so: [hyperlink]
Responder: nal decision screen
Your nal decision
As you already know, you have the role of player B. If you want to have another
look at the basic structure of the game, please click here [hyperlink].
Player A made the o¤er 5:5.
If you accept, you will receive 5 Lotto-Euros and player A will receive 5 Lotto-Euros.
If you reject, both of you will receive 0 Lotto-Euros.
Do you accept the o¤er? [yes / no]
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Responder: post-experimental questionnaire
Questions relating to the ultimatum mini-game:
 Did you expect a di¤erent o¤er from player A? [yes / no]
 Did you know this game before? [yes / no]
 Have you talked to somebody else about this game before you made your
initial decision? [yes / no]
 If so, has your initial decision been inuenced in this way; i.e., did this make
a di¤erence with regard to your initial decision? [yes / no]
 Have you talked to somebody else about this game after you made your initial
decision? [yes / no]
 If so, has your nal decision been inuenced in this way; i.e., did this make a
di¤erence with regard to your nal decision? [yes / no]
 Why have you changed your decision or otherwise why did you stick to your
decision? [ ____________ ]
Questions relating to experienced emotions:
Please enter for each of the emotions that are listed below the extent to which you
have felt the respective emotion at the time of your nal decision that you have just
made.
To do so, please click each time at one of the seven boxes, where
1 = emotion has not been feltand
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7 = emotion has been felt very strongly.
emotion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
envy
anger
joy
surprise
gratefulness
CRT questions:
 A bat and a ball together cost 110 cents. The bat costs 100 cents more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? [ _____ cents ]
 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets? [ ____ minutes ]
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake? [ ____ days ]
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